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ABSTRACT
Kevin Vallier defends a theory of the normative limits of the use of coercion by the state
known as convergence liberalism. Central to this theory is a principle of public justification
according to which the coercive power of the state is justified and legitimate if and only if each
member of the public has sufficient reason to endorse the coercion. I argue that this principle is
too demanding. Certain epistemological limitations render cost-benefit analyses of many, if not
all, laws and policies inconclusive. This, together with the fact of evaluative pluralism, make it
the case that very few coercive laws and regulations will be publicly justified. The result is that
convergence liberalism threatens to obstruct the state’s capacity to protect the environment and
address preventable forms of injustice.
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INTRODUCTION

One central and divisive question regarding the moral limits of state power is the problem of
its public justification. Following the liberal tradition, if we start with the assumption that all
persons are free and equal, it seems to follow that the state’s use of coercion against its citizens is
pro tanto wrong. Some claim that for such coercion to be morally permissible, it must be justified
for the persons subject to the coercion. Otherwise, the coercion is “authoritarian.”1 But the
question of how such coercion can and should be justified is complicated by evaluative
pluralism, i.e., the fact that in a liberal society persons will develop diverse and incompatible, but
nonetheless epistemically justifiable conceptions of the good.2 The challenge facing theories of
political justification and legitimacy is to explain how a coercive social arrangement (e.g., a
coercive law) that binds such a diverse citizenry can be justified and legitimate given the
possibility, indeed the likelihood, of deep disagreement regarding whether the coercion is
warranted. Recently, a theory known as convergence liberalism (or justificatory liberalism) has
emerged to answer how a publicly justified and legitimate moral and political order can obtain.
On this view, a moral rule, coercive law, or constitutional principle is publicly justified and
legitimate if and only if all members of a diverse political community have sufficient reason to
endorse it from their own point of view, i.e., from reasons they can claim as their own.3

1

Gaus 2011, p. 16.
Evaluative pluralism obtains in virtue of what Rawls called “the burdens of judgment,“ i.e., “sources, or causes, of
disagreement among reasonable persons,” which include, among other things, the difficulty in assessing and
evaluating empirical and scientific evidence, differences in the relative weight afforded to different considerations,
the indeterminacy or vagueness of concepts, the influence of one’s peculiar “total experience” on the way one assess
evidence and weighs different values, the difficulty in making a comprehensive assessment of an issue with
normative considerations on different sides of a conflict, and the necessity of prioritizing and adjusting cherished
values. In virtue of the burdens of judgment persons can be epistemically justified (or “reasonable”) in affirming
different beliefs, values and conceptions of the good (Rawls 2005, pp. 54 -7). For Kevin Vallier's more recent
treatment of evaluative pluralism, see Vallier 2019 p. 20-21.
3
Gaus 1996; Gaus 2011; Vallier 2014; Vallier 2019.
2
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In this essay, I analyze and evaluate convergence liberalism, focusing on the practical
implications of the public justification principle (hereafter PJP) for the prospect of publicly
justifying coercive laws. Specifically, I analyze the extent to which convergence liberalism is
compatible with the imposition of laws and regulations that are designed to address
environmental problems that arise within a free market capitalist economy. I first provide a brief
exposition of the basic structure of convergence liberalism as it is laid out by Kevin Vallier in his
Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation. I then analyze the stringency of PJP and
consider its implications for the prospect of enacting laws of social justice, in particular laws and
policies designed to protect the environment and public health from harm caused by unrestrained
economic forces. I conclude that while convergence liberalism is internally consistent, the
stringent conditions of the public justification principle may obstruct the state’s capacity to
effectively respond to the demands of justice and so should be rejected.
2

CONVERGENCE LIBERALISM

Convergence liberalism asserts that a commitment to respecting the natural liberty and
equality of persons requires that coercive laws be justified for each person subject to the law.
This ideal of public justification is formally articulated in a public justification principle (PJP)
which delineates necessary conditions for the legitimacy of coercive laws.4 According to the
convergence liberal version of PJP, state coercion is publicly justified and legitimate if and only
if all citizens have sufficient reason to affirm that the coercion is warranted according to their
own evaluative standards, i.e., their beliefs, values, norms, conceptions of the good, etc. Several
features of this view require comment.

4

Vallier 2014, p. 41.
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First, while some public reason views (sometimes called consensus liberalism) conceive
public justification as a process of deliberation on terms that are accessible or shareable to all
participating members, convergence liberalism understands public justification to be “essentially
a relation between persons, laws and reasons – a social state that obtains when each person has
sufficient reason to endorse a law.”5 As a social state, public justification is understood to
manifest spontaneously;6 it obtains when all members of the public just so happen to have
sufficient reason to endorse a coercive law or constitutional principle from their own point of
view, that is, on the basis of reasons each can recognize as their own and with which others may
disagree. This means that no specific set of reasons will be independently sufficient to positively
justify coercion. The power of citizens’ justificatory reasons to determine legislative outcomes is
mostly negative: a set of reasons may defeat coercive laws but not by themselves positively
justify them.
As convergence liberalism gives room for the justificatory reasons of members of the public
(MOPs) to determine the public justification of collectively binding laws, some normative
stipulations on justificatory reasons are necessary to avoid unreasonable influences on the
political order, “the error of populism.”7 But for Vallier, respecting evaluative pluralism requires
that a conception of justificatory reasons not be too restrictive. One of the central aims of
Vallier’s theory is to show that public reason liberalism need not require that citizens refrain
from appealing to reasons they have by virtue of their religious or controversial moral
commitments in their political engagement.8 On his view, requiring such restraint from members
of the public threatens to violate their integrity, especially when they have decisive religious or

5

Ibid., p. 35.
Ibid., pp. 168 – 169.
7
Ibid., p. 160.
8
Vallier 2014. See also Gaus and Vallier 2009.
6

6

moral reasons to reject an instance of coercion.9 The convergence liberal thus rejects
requirements that justificatory reasons be based on common evaluative standards or that they be
shared by all members of the public. Instead, the justificatory reasons of MOPs need only be
intelligible to all members of the public to count for or against a given law or principle. For
Vallier, “A’s reason RA is intelligible for all members of the public if and only if members of the
public regard RA as epistemically justified for A according to A’s evaluative standards,” where
epistemic justification is understood in the minimal sense that A “makes no gross epistemic
error” in affirming RA, and so is “rationally entitled to affirm” it.10 Moreover, intelligible reasons
must be "recognizably moral reasons, or at least reasons that the person in question can see as
moral rather than as immoral,” given her evaluative standards.11 Importantly, convergence
liberalism is committed to reckoning with “agent-relative” evaluative standards among members
of the public.12 This means convergence liberalism takes reasons of members of the public that
are grounded in comprehensive doctrines (i.e., belief–value sets) that not all members of the
public will necessarily share or even completely understand as eligible for determining whether a
law is justified.
As PJP requires that each member of the public have sufficient reason to endorse state
coercion, it is important to understand the convergence liberal’s account of sufficient reasons. On
Vallier’s view, it is not enough that a person has some intelligible reason to endorse a law, for
she may discover countervailing reasons that lead her to reject it. Thus, “it is only when coercion
is justified by conclusive reasons [according to each agent’s evaluative standards] that we can

Vallier 2014, pp. 4, 57 – 66, 71 – 2.
Ibid., p. 106.
11
Vallier 2019, pp. 90 – 91.
12
Vallier 2014, p. 106.
9

10
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say that each citizen is committed to the coercion proposed.”13 Gaus provides a similar account.
For him, a member of the public “has (provisionally) a sufficient reason R if and only if a
“respectable amount” of good reasoning by [that person] would conclude that R is an undefeated
reason (to act or believe).”14 Importantly, this account does not require that each member of the
public have conclusive reason to endorse a coercive law over all plausible alternatives. Such a
standard would obviously be far too stringent. What it does require is that each MOP have
conclusive reason to endorse some law against the alternative of having no law at all regarding
the matter in question. If all members of the public can agree that each member of a set of
various possible laws would be better than a state of liberty (i.e., having no law at all on the
matter in question), those laws comprise a “socially eligible set,” and one member of the set can
be publicly justified via social decision procedures even if not all members of the public view the
result as optimal.15
Still, given the sheer diversity of citizens’ evaluative standards and reasons, an obvious
worry is that hardly any coercive law would be such that every person has sufficient reason to
endorse it against a state of liberty. Especially given that some members of the public are liable
to hold extreme views, lack relevant information, and commit errors in reasoning, convergence
liberalism may appear to threaten anarchy. To avoid this worry and make the theory plausible,
Vallier employs a moderately idealized conception of members of the public (MOPs), according
to which MOPs are assumed to meet realistic standards of reasonableness, rationality, and
knowledge. As rational, members form their beliefs based on sound, though defeasible, rules of
Vallier 2012, p. 151. By “conclusive reasons” Vallier means conclusive for that person.
Gaus 2011, p. 250.
15
Vallier 2014, pp. 28, 99 – 100, 166; Gaus 2010, pp. 249 – 250. On Gaus and Vallier's view, the social decision
procedure(s) by which one member of a set of socially eligible laws is chosen need not itself be conclusively
justified to all MOPs, for to require public justification of decision procedures is liable to result in an infinite regress
of public justification requirements, since there may be dissensus about which decision procedures are optimal. See
Gaus 2011, pp. 389 – 409; Vallier 2019, pp. 110 – 112.
13
14
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inference. They seek out information relevant to their practical interests that they are able to
access and process effectively given constraints on time and energy, and they are mostly (though
not necessarily completely) coherent in their beliefs and values.16 A moderately idealized agent
is also reasonable in that she “(1) complies with publicly justified principles and offers
intelligible reasons for her proposals, (2) she recognizes the burdens of judgment and (3) she
rejects repressing other reasonable points of view.”17 Via moderate idealization, public
justification is thought to be fairly resistant (though not impervious) to the errors of populism, as
moderately idealized persons will be disposed to acknowledge and endorse laws that are clearly
necessary or warranted to any rational, well-informed and reasonable individual.18
Finally, as the reasons of MOPs are diverse and widely dispersed, the convergence liberal
requires an account of how a political order can be successful in its commitment to only
imposing laws that are publicly justified. For Vallier, a commitment to PJP requires that the
legislative and judicial branches of government be sensitive to the intelligible reasons of MOPs.
This requirement gives rise to two additional regulative principles on the legislative process. The
Principle of Intelligible Exclusion (PIE) requires that “(i) lawmaking bodies … only impose laws
on members of the public that members of the public have sufficient intelligible reason to
endorse and (ii) repeal or reform laws that members of the public have sufficient intelligible
reason to reject.”19 Realizing this goal in practice is liable to be difficult and complex since the
reasons of MOPs will not be entirely known by those responsible for proposing and imposing

Vallier 2014, pp. 160 – 162.
Ibid., p. 163.
18
It is worth stressing that on Vallier’s view members of the public can only be idealized so much. The intelligible
reasons MOPs can be expected to endorse must satisfy the cognition criterion, i.e., "they should be reasons that
ordinary persons can reach through reflection, and not reasons that would only be endorsed after a great amount of
cognitive exertion” (Vallier 2019, p. 98). This limitation is necessary, in his view, in order to "identify reasons that
are adequately motivating for normally functioning members of the public" (ibid.).
19
Ibid., p. 184.
16
17
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coercive laws. At the very least, however, it requires that any members of the public who
justifiably believe their vote or advocacy for coercive laws will significantly affect political
outcomes (e.g., legislators) exercise restraint; they should not advocate or vote for laws that they
justifiably believe some member(s) of the public lack sufficient intelligible reason to endorse.
Vallier calls this latter requirement the Principle of Convergent Restraint (PCR).20 In the event
that some coercive law or legislative proposal is revealed to be not publicly justified (for
instance, by the expressed intelligible dissent of some member(s) of the public), the appropriate
course of action is understood to depend on the circumstance. For example, if only a small
minority of MOPs have sufficient reason to reject a law, whether for religious or secular
reasons,21 the proper response may be to grant the intelligible dissenters an accommodation or an
exemption from the law in question. When this is not feasible the law should be repealed
altogether.22
In sum, the public justification principle stipulates that a coercive law is legitimate if and
only if all members of the public have sufficient reason to endorse it, where members of the
public are moderately idealized such that they express reasons intelligible to all members of the
public for why they affirm or reject an instance of state coercion and commit no gross epistemic
errors in so doing. The public justification principle imposes obligations on legislators and
judges to do their best to refrain from imposing laws that are not publicly justified and repeal
existing laws that MOPs have sufficient reason to reject. For Vallier, a liberal order thus
conceived is morally valuable because the moral and legal order of society is such that each

20

Ibid. p. 191. The restraint required for judges is different because the reasons and decisions of judges have the
potential to positively influence future law. For this reason, judges are obligated to issue decisions regarding the
constitutionality of coercive law based on reasons that all citizens share, or at least that appeal to common evaluative
standards that are accessible to all (p. 195).
21
Ibid. pp. 217 – 219.
22
This is implied by PIE. See also ibid., p. 199.
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member not only has sufficient reason to comply with moral and legal rules (as is the goal for a
modus vivendi), but each also has sufficient reason to internalize the moral and legal order as
compatible with her conception of the good.23 This in turn has great practical value because it
ensures that the moral and legal order of society is stable. Since members of the public have
sufficient reason to internalize moral and legal rules (and the legal system is structured to reckon
with the reasons of citizens for whom this is not the case), members of the public can justifiably
trust that fellow members will comply with the moral and legal order to which they are
collectively bound.24
3

CONVERGENCE LIBERALISM AND PUBLICLY JUSTIFIED COERCION

3.1 Convergence Liberalism’s “Classical Tilt”
One notable feature of convergence liberalism as it is developed by Gaus and Vallier is
that it is concerned with legitimate rules and laws for our current conditions.25 Thus, for instance,
unlike competing conceptions of political legitimacy, convergence liberalism acknowledges and
reckons with deep evaluative pluralism among members of the public and refrains from
assuming universal compliance with a publicly justified morality and system of law.26 Given the
goal of convergence liberalism to articulate a theory that is compelling and realistic given current

Ibid., p. 96 – 98.
For an at length discussion of convergence liberalism and social trust, see Vallier 2019.
25
It is worth noting that the moderate idealization of persons does not undermine this. The model of moderate
idealization Vallier develops is designed explicitly to stay within the bounds of what can be plausibly expected of
actual persons given the limitations on time, cognitive capacity, information, etc. that confront the average person in
the "real world." For a defense of moderate idealization against worries related to this point, see Vallier 2014, pp.
170 – 172; Vallier 2019, pp. 103 – 107.
26
This is to be contrasted with, for example, Rawlsian ideal theory which invokes a thicker conception of the
idealization of persons that is not necessarily limited to what persons can be expected to live up to given current
conditions, and which assumes reasonably favorable social conditions and idealizes away the possibility of
lawbreaking (Wenar 2017, p. 6).
23
24
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political realities, a critical analysis of convergence liberalism would do well to consider its
practical implications.
Perhaps the most striking feature of convergence liberalism is the extent to which it
systematically limits the powers of government, given the diverse beliefs and values of
moderately idealized members of the public. As Gaus has argued, the structure of convergence
liberalism is such that the legislative apparatus “tilts” in the direction of classical liberalism, i.e.,
a political system that guarantees extensive private property rights and economic freedom.27 This
classical “tilt” of convergence liberalism is a fairly straightforward result of the justificatory
burden PJP places on the use of coercion and the fact of evaluative pluralism: since all instances
of coercion must be such that every member of the public has sufficient reason to endorse it,
those members of the public who, in virtue of their evaluative standards, tend to weigh the costs
of coercion very highly and be skeptical of the benefits of coercion (e.g., classical liberals) will
not have sufficient reason to endorse laws that other members of the public view as optimal. As a
result, the forms of legal coercion that stand a chance of being publicly justified will be limited
to those laws that classical liberals will have sufficient reason to endorse over a state of liberty.
Since classical liberals value liberty very highly, weigh the costs of coercion very highly, and are
generally skeptical of the benefits of coercion, their evaluative standards will tilt the legislative
apparatus towards less, rather than more, coercion.28
Consider figure 1, which represents Gaus’s analysis of convergence liberalism’s
“classical tilt.” The data on the graph is supposed to represent (members of the public) Alf and
Betty’s ordinal utility function for their deliberation (based on their evaluative standards) on the
choice-worthiness of various legislative proposals, with L0 representing a state of liberty and L1,

27
28

Gaus 2010.
Ibid.
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L2, L3, L4 and L5 representing legislative proposals ordered in increasing degrees of state
coercion, with L1 being more coercive than L0, L2 being more coercive than L1, and so on. For
Alf and Betty, one line represents their assessment of the pro tanto utility of the different
legislative proposals. Importantly, “utility is not an independent goal, much less self-interest, but
a mathematical representation of an ordering of the choice worthiness of outcomes.”29 Pro tanto
utility is weighed against Alf and Betty’s relative assessment of the costs of coercion of the
legislative proposals. Together, the figure is designed to represent the ordinal ranking of the
balance of costs and benefits of different legislative proposals. At the point that coercion costs
exceed pro tanto utility for Alf or Betty, they no longer have sufficient reason to endorse state
coercion, and so the law is thereby not publicly justified and removed from the “eligible set” of
legislative proposals. The graph allows us to see how classical liberals, or those members of the
public who tend to evaluate coercion costs very highly, will tend to tilt the set of eligible laws
towards less coercion. Even though Betty finds L3 to be the most choice-worthy law, L3 is
ineligible because, for Alf, the costs of L3 exceed the pro tanto utility of L3 according to his
evaluative standards.30

29

Gaus 2010, p. 266.
This is a representation of an analysis in Gaus 2010, p. 267, presented here for illustrative purposes. This is a
somewhat simplified version of the final analysis Gaus offers, which takes into account the fact that members of the
public are liable to disagree about the relative coerciveness of various laws. Gaus argues that even given
disagreements about the coerciveness of laws, the classical tilt still holds. See pp. 268 – 269.
30
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Analysis of Convergence Liberalism's "Classical Tilt"
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Figure 1 Analysis of Convergence Liberalism’s “Classical Tilt”
The classical tilt means that convergence liberalism stacks the deck, as it were, against
the use of coercion by the state. Since all members of the public must have conclusive reason of
their own to endorse coercion, those members whose evaluative standards are most resistant to
the use of coercion will effectively determine the set of eligible laws. This effect may seem
unfair and have potentially drastic consequences. As I intend to argue in what follows, the
practical implications of PJP are highly questionable indeed. However, it is important to recall
that convergence liberalism stipulates that the reasons of members of the public must be
intelligible to all moderately idealized members of the public for their reasons to endorse or
reject a coercive law to legitimately determine its public justification. Gaus holds that the
evaluative standards and reasons of classical liberals meet these normative epistemic
requirements.31 But if, for example, the radical anarchist does not have sufficient reason to

31
See Gaus 2010, p. 271: "Mill's view of the dangers of coercion is manifestly an intelligible and
reasonable basis for deliberating about laws; it connects up with a wide range of basic and intelligible human
values." Gaus develops this point at length in "State Neutrality and Controversial Values in On Liberty” in "On
Liberty": A Critical Guide, ed. C.L. Ten. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
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endorse any state coercion whatsoever, this would not mean that no laws are publicly justified
according to the convergence liberal, for the reasons of the radical anarchist may not be
intelligible to all MOPs or may not survive moderate idealization. This means that the extent to
which the reasons of members of the public can constrict the set of eligible laws is a function of
how intelligibility and moderate idealization are conceived. I will return to this point later in the
analysis.
3.2 Policy Epistemology and the Justification of Coercion
Gaus’s analysis of convergence liberalism's classical tilt is helpful in that it provides a
model by which the effects of the public justification principle on the set of eligible laws can be
assessed with some degree of accuracy. As Gaus argues, given the presence of classical liberal
evaluative standards, socialism will be defeated in favor of “private property regimes… with
considerable economic freedom.”32 Further, “The classical liberal [members of the public] are
apt to hold that almost every redistributive plan or scheme of social justice is worse than no
redistributive/social justice laws at all.”33 The result is that convergence liberalism favors
“private-property based regimes… with considerable economic freedom,” something resembling
laissez-faire capitalism. Of course, it is likely not the case that only pure laissez-faire capitalism
can be publicly justified, because even classical liberals are liable to find some minimal
redistribution scheme in a state that otherwise has extensive protections for private property to be
better than no private property regime at all.34 However, the basic effects of the classical liberal
influence are clear enough: convergence liberalism favors (something like) capitalism with

32

Gaus 2010, p. 255.
Ibid., p. 258.
34
This qualification obtains if the scheme of private property rights is justified together with redistribution laws
rather than independently. Vallier and Gaus both argue that sociopolitical arrangements should generally be publicly
justified independent of others when it is feasible, however. See Gaus 2011, pp. 490 – 491; Vallier 2019, pp. 174 –
177. See also Quong 2011, pp. 273 – 287.
33
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minimal redistribution and minimal, if any, coercive laws designed to enforce a scheme of social
justice.35 But from Gaus’s analysis alone it remains somewhat vague just how minimal the set of
laws will be in a convergence liberal state. It is widely believed that laissez-faire capitalism is
liable to give rise to, or is at least compatible with, social forms that many reasonably consider to
be lamentable or unjust. Extreme poverty, group-based oppression, and unsustainable
environmental degradation are obvious examples. Many reasonably believe that the best means
of ameliorating lamentable or unjust social forms is through the imposition of laws to regulate or
prohibit causally related social practices. It is worth asking to what extent, if any, convergence
liberalism leaves room for the use of coercion to address such lamentable or unjust social forms.
Analyzing this question, I submit, reveals a crucial epistemological element to the public
justification principle that helps to illuminate the practical implications of convergence
liberalism, at least as it is developed by Vallier in Liberal Politics and Public Faith.
To begin, it is worth observing that when tasked with determining whether coercive laws
are publicly justified and legitimate, a justificatory burden lies on legislative bodies to determine
that there is conclusive reason to endorse the law in question. It is important to recognize why
this is the case. As noted above, convergence liberalism conceives public justification as a social
state in which all members of the public have sufficient reason of their own to endorse a moral
rule or law. It is not typically conceived as a process of public deliberation or justification on the
part of legislative bodies. This being the case, it may seem that convergence liberalism does not
require legislative bodies to (be prepared to) demonstrate that laws are publicly justified by

35

By "a scheme of social justice" I mean a scheme for realizing a conception of what justice requires with respect to
a specific issue. This would typically involve the assertion that some feature of the sociopolitical system is unjust
and requires adjusting. For example, the assertion that certain sociopolitical conditions enable gender-based
discrimination, which results in unjust forms of inequality, together with a plan to utilize coercive means to reduce
or eliminate such gender–based discrimination, would be a scheme of social justice as I understand the term here.
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appeal to evidence that there is conclusive reason for all to endorse it. However, while there may
be little or no need on the part of some authority to demonstrate that moral rules are publicly
justified, since moral rules are not necessarily enforced by a central authority, imposing and
enforcing legal rules in the form of coercive laws does require some compelling epistemological
support indicating the law is (sufficiently likely to be) publicly justified. This is so for two
reasons. First, compelling epistemological support that a coercive law is publicly justified is
required for legislators to appropriately respect PJP. As noted above, Vallier understands PJP to
impose duties on legislators, via the principle of convergent restraint, to only vote for or
advocate laws that all members of the public have sufficient reason to endorse.36 But as the
intelligible reasons of MOPs are numerous, diverse and widely dispersed, requiring legislators to
determine whether all MOPs do in fact have sufficient reason to endorse laws would be too
demanding. So, legislators must to do their best to respect this requirement and only vote for or
advocate laws that they “justifiably believe” all members of the public have sufficient reason to
endorse.37 “Importantly,” Vallier adds, “these beliefs should have good epistemic credentials.”38
Vallier does not specify what constitutes “good epistemic credentials” in this context, but clearly
a rigorous and honest assessment of the reasons available to believe the law will be seen as worth
endorsing from diverse points of view is necessary to appropriately discharge this duty. At a
minimum, this should involve assessments of the reasons members of the public offer for their

36

Vallier 2014, p. 191.
Vallier 2014, p. 187. Vallier articulates the principle of convergence restraint (PCR) negatively, requiring that "a
legislator should not vote for law L in order to contribute to M’s becoming or remaining law (where L may be
equivalent to M) if he justifiably believes that members of the public lack sufficient reason Rn to endorse M.” (p.
191). Here I articulate the principle positively, mainly for the sake of clarity, when I couch PCR as requiring
legislators to only vote for laws they justifiably believe all members of the public have sufficient reason to endorse.
Regardless of how it is articulated, the idea remains the same.
38
Ibid., p. 187.
37
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positions,39 as well as social scientific evidence relevant to evaluating the costs and benefits of
the law in question.
The second reason legislators and other state representatives who act to impose coercive
laws face a justificatory burden is brought out by the fact that PJP does not address all actual
citizens, but only their moderately idealized counterparts.40 It would hardly be surprising if every
law proposed or enacted by a legislative body would be such that some citizen believes they do
not have sufficient reason to endorse it. The presence of radical anarchists would be sufficient to
make that the case. However, this alone would not necessarily be sufficient to defeat a law or
grant such persons an exemption under convergence liberalism; such consequences are only
called for if the reasons of a dissenter live up to the standards of a moderately idealized agent,
i.e., they are intelligible and survive some critical scrutiny. If a legislative body is to be steadfast
in imposing coercive laws against dissenters whose reasons it doesn’t recognize as justificatory,
surely it (that is, its members) must have some reason(s) that are sufficient to justify their belief
that the law is publicly justified despite the unidealized dissenter’s complaint.41 These reflections
reveal that convergence liberalism's commitment to PJP implies the exercise of political
authority must be backed by good epistemic credentials. And since the epistemic credentials of
legislators and other members of lawmaking bodies exert an influence in determining the public
justification of laws, some specification of what constitutes “good epistemic credentials” is
required to fully grasp the legal implications of convergence liberalism. What is required, in

Vallier 2019 pp. 119 – 120. Vallier also suggests social scientific evidence regarding rule compliance, specialized
forms of media, and "political philosophical models" to determine whether a moral rule or law is publicly justified
(ibid).
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other words, is an account of policy epistemology, i.e., an account of the standards of evidence
that, if met, are sufficient to justify legislators in their belief that some law is publicly justified.
I submit that PJP’s requirement that all members of the public have sufficient reason to
endorse coercive laws, together with Vallier’s model of moderate idealization and the relatively
permissive intelligibility requirement for justificatory reasons (as they are developed in Liberal
Politics and Public Faith) give rise to extremely stringent standards for policy epistemology,
which reveal convergence liberalism to be inimical to the prospects of proposing and imposing
laws of social justice.
The case for this point is straightforward: since Vallier adopts the relatively permissive
requirement that justificatory reasons be intelligible, then it follows from PJP that an MOP’s
having (and expressing) intelligible reason to reject a coercive law, preferring no law at all, is
sufficient to render that law not publicly justified, and thus (per PIE) to warrant an exemption or
a repeal of the law altogether. This implies that so long as a coercive law is intelligibly
rejectable, it is liable to be defeated under PJP. But given the permissive conditions for
intelligibility (being epistemically justified for an individual according to that individual’s own
evaluative standards), the fact of evaluative pluralism, and the sheer complexity of large scale,
collectively binding laws, the vast majority of (if not all) significantly coercive laws are bound to
be intelligibly rejectable, and thus liable to be defeated. This much is probably sufficient for the
reader to get a general sense of the prospects for publicly justifying laws of social justice under
convergence liberalism. Because the rationale for many schemes of social justice are based in
part on comprehensive moral doctrines or empirical claims that are reasonably or intelligibly
rejectable, and coercive laws infringe upon the freedom of persons, many persons will have
prima facie reason to resist laws of social justice and will not have sufficient reason of their own

19

to endorse them. It is to be expected, then, that laws designed to realize or implement a scheme
of social justice will generally be defeated.
Some readers may consider this result a virtue of convergence liberalism. After all,
imposing coercive laws on persons that they do not have sufficient reason to endorse is clearly
prima facie undesirable and morally questionable. Avoiding moral authoritarianism is indeed a
virtue. My concern is that the convergence liberal’s staunch commitment to avoiding moral
authoritarianism, and the very stringent conditions for policy epistemology to which this
commitment gives rise, imposes a justificatory burden on the use of coercion that is so stringent
that it threatens to obstruct the state’s capacity to enact laws that are truly important. I noted
earlier that the kind of socioeconomic order that convergence liberalism is thought to manifest,
something resembling laissez-faire capitalism, is widely believed to be conducive to or
compatible with social forms that are lamentable or unjust. To make my case, I consider the
prospects for the convergence liberal state’s capacity to remedy such conditions by enacting
legislation to regulate or prohibit causally related social practices.
I would like to begin by considering in more depth the implications of the intelligibility
requirement, evaluative pluralism, and the complexity of laws for the prospects of satisfying the
demands of PJP. It is obvious that with respect to some social practice ф believed to be causally
related to the production of social forms that are lamentable or arguably unjust, some members
of the public will have an interest in preserving the freedom to ф without coercive intervention.
In the context of laissez-faire capitalism, there is typically some compelling economic incentive
to engage in the practice(s) some law purports to regulate or prohibit. In the case of worker
exploitation, for example, employers see they have an economic incentive to offer the least
amount of pay and benefits to workers they can manage while preserving a productive
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workforce. Similarly, industrial firms are sometimes incentivized to engage in unsustainable
environmental degradation because of greater costs involved in more environmentally
responsible operations. Given compelling economic or other incentives to engage in some
practice ф, especially when the practice comprises a significant part of one’s life goals or plans,
members of the public engaged in these practices will have prima facie reason to resist coercion
that threatens to regulate or prohibit their freedom to ф. Of course, presumably moderately
idealized members of the public will refrain from assessing the costs and benefits of a law purely
in terms of their own self-interests, so we should not expect every law that goes against the selfinterests of members of the public to be defeated.42 However, given that some MOPs are liable to
be interested in retaining the freedom to engage in forms of behavior that are to be regulated or
prohibited by some law, their evaluative standards, much like those of classical liberals, are
liable to lead them to weigh the costs of the law relatively high and be skeptical of the benefits
the law purports to bring.
The effect of self-interest captures only one possible force that is liable to influence the
reasons and evaluative standards of some members of the public to resist favoring particular
coercive laws. It is important also to consider the influence of one’s lived experience in shaping
one’s evaluative standards and beliefs about the good. Discussing the difficulties of publicly
justifying laws of social justice, Charles Mills notes, “under nonideal circumstances, where
social oppression is the norm, the group interests of the privileged and their differential group
experience will generate rationalizations of the existing order, so that contesting social privilege
to realize social justice will necessarily mean encountering and combating such ideologies."43

Perhaps this is implied by Vallier’s stipulation that intelligible reasons must be “moral reasons,” or at least not
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Mills is pointing to an important and real psychological tendency which may be generally stated
thusly: if some state of affairs S is important to an agent’s ability to pursue his or her life plans,
or is essential to obtaining or maintaining some personal interest, or is taken for granted as
normal, then the agent will be disposed to generate rationalizations of S against conflicting
evidence or ideologies so long as he can do so without making gross errors in reasoning. This
may be appropriately described as a sort of system – justification bias, i.e., a tendency to favor or
rationalize the status quo.44 If this is a real psychological tendency among rational agents, it is
liable to exert some influence on the evaluative standards of some MOPs, making them resistant
to endorsing coercive proposals that threaten to interfere with their established way of life or
personal goals.45
The psychological effects of self-interest and the possibility of a sort of systemjustification bias provide reason to believe that most, if not all, significantly coercive legislative
proposals will be met with resistance among some members of the public. At the very least, this
provides reason to expect that MOPs for whom a law threatens their self-interests or their
established way of life will be rationally motivated to discover whether the law in question is
truly such that they have conclusive reason to endorse it, and do so by seeking out relevant

Systems justification theory holds that “people are motivated to justify and rationalize the way things are, so that
existing social economic, and political arrangements tend to be perceived as fair and legitimate" (Jost and Hunyady
2005, p. 260). System–justification bias has been correlated with a tendency to resist social change. See ibid, pp.
262-263.
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may arise in virtue of such errors in reasoning among members of the public. However, it is not clear whether appeal
to moderate idealization is available to Vallier on this point. Vallier requires that justificatory reasons be intelligible.
So long as all members of the public acknowledge that the reasons put forth by a fellow MOPs are intelligible, the
question of whether those reasons are altogether sincere or motivated by self-interest or are in part the result of bias
seems beside the point. Indeed, there would seem to be no reliable way of detecting insincerity or bias so long as the
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information regarding why the law is being proposed, what it purports to accomplish, how likely
it is to be efficacious, whether there are viable noncoercive alternatives, and whether the benefits
of the law are sufficiently likely to outweigh the costs. If, after an honest examination, such
MOPs are not convinced that the law in question is sufficiently likely to bring about net benefits
that outweigh the net costs, then they likely won't have sufficient reason to endorse it. And since
such MOPs have strong prima facie reason to resist coercion, their evaluative standards will
likely dispose them to weigh the costs of coercion relatively highly. They may also be inclined to
weigh the benefits the law purports to bring relatively low or be skeptical that the law in question
is sufficiently likely to bring about those benefits, given the evidence available. This suggests
that in order to generate convergence on coercive regulations on economic forces in a
sociopolitical order otherwise characterized by extensive private property rights and economic
freedom, the evidence available to indicate the law is warranted must live up to very stringent
epistemological standards, as it will generally have to be sufficient to convince even the most
skeptical members of the public that the law is in fact sufficiently important, and sufficiently
likely to be efficacious, to justify the costs of coercion.
However, basic limitations in policy epistemology make it such that empirical evidence
that is sufficiently compelling to convince all MOPs will rarely obtain. The social consequences
of laws and policies is extraordinarily difficult to predict in advance, or even to track after laws
have been enacted. In his forthcoming book, Vallier acknowledges some of the basic
epistemological challenges that obstruct reliable and comprehensive assessments of the
socioeconomic effects of laws and policies. The first relates to difficulties in evaluating the
budgetary impact of a piece of legislation. Remarkably, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
admits, “it is often difficult or impossible to determine, even in retrospect, the incremental
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impact on the budget of a particular piece of legislation.”46 Second, Vallier notes, “recent work
on the ability of experts to predict social outcomes has shown that their abilities are much more
limited than we might have otherwise expected… This means that even the most honest attempts
to predict the outcomes of public policy are bound to meet with limited success. So, meeting
even the most basic standards of policy epistemology is going to be difficult given the limitations
of expert prediction.”47 Third, “reasonable pluralism among economists is deep, especially on
macroeconomic policy. If so, satisfying the standards of economic policy epistemology is quite
difficult, since few policies have enough support from economic experts to serve as a basis for
convincing citizens who disagree with the expert consensus of a culpable epistemic or moral
error.”48 And fourth, members of the public must be sufficiently confident that any coercive
regulations will not be susceptible to the threat of rent seeking, i.e., to corporations manipulating
a regulatory apparatus to work in their favor to maximize profit, which will be difficult to
assess.49
These brief reflections on policy epistemology suggest that given the sheer complexity of
large – scale socioeconomic systems, the accuracy of mechanisms for predicting and measuring
the socioeconomic impact of laws and policies is very limited. These limitations of policy
epistemology have important implications for the prospects of publicly justifying laws of social
justice. Since some members of the public are liable to have strong prima facie reasons to
preserve their freedom to engage in practices for which they have a compelling economic
incentive, or which form an important part of their established way of life, any laws purporting to
regulate or prohibit such practices are likely to be met with some resistance. Such members of
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the public are liable to have evaluative standards that weigh the costs of coercion with respect to
such laws very highly and are skeptical of the benefits such laws purport to bring. Such persons
may reasonably demand compelling evidence that the law in question will be sufficiently likely
to bring about some tangible benefit that outweighs its costs. However, the sheer complexity of
policy epistemology is such that conclusive evidence that the law will bring more benefits than
costs rarely, if ever, obtain. Convergence liberalism thus has bleak prospects for the public
justification of laws of social justice.
4

A CASE IN POINT: PUBLICLY JUSTIFYING COERCIVE REGULATIONS

That convergence liberalism systematically limits the set of eligible laws in a sociopolitical
order is acknowledged, and even celebrated, by the main proponents of the theory.50 However, I
submit that the conditions for justified coercion imposed by PJP are too extreme. In the previous
section, I hope to have provided the reader a sense for why this may be the case. Conceiving the
public justification principle as delineating necessary conditions on the legitimate use of coercion
threatens to render any legislative proposal that admits of intelligible disagreement unjustified
and, qua PJP, illegitimate. However, given evaluative pluralism and present limitations on the
accuracy and reliability of policy epistemology, the vast majority, if not all, of coercive laws will
be susceptible to intelligible disagreement by some member(s) of the public. The problem with
this arrangement is that the conditions for public justification are so stringent that the set of laws
that some MOPs lack sufficient reason to endorse is liable to include some laws that are very
important.
Consider, for example, cases in which unregulated industrial practices produce negative
externalities, i.e., costs born on third parties rather than industrial firms themselves. Typical
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examples of this phenomenon include (potentially) hazardous pollution of land, air and
waterways. The production of negative externalities is most uncontroversially unjust when
negative externalities result in tangible costs borne by third parties by way of destruction of
another’s property or damage to another’s health. The production of negative externalities is
typically profit–driven; industrial firms engage in practices that result in potentially harmful
forms of pollution or other externalities because such practices are often the least costly, at least
in the short run, for the firms themselves. Since firms, generally speaking, have a vested interest
in minimizing the costs of production, they have an interest in preserving the freedom to engage
in the least costly means of production, even if they have reason to suspect the least costly means
of production produces more negative externalities than more costly alternatives.51 Furthermore,
whatever damage to property or health, or whatever other costs are borne by third parties by less
than fully responsible industrial practices is often difficult and costly to measure, such that the
accuracy of measurements of damage to third parties caused by industrial practices are liable to
be susceptible to reasonable, or intelligible, doubt.52 Evaluative pluralism and limitations in
policy epistemology together make it such that any coercive laws that are designed to ameliorate
harms in cases where industrial firms’ productive practices result in costs to third parties that are
arguably unjust stand little chance of being deemed permissible according to PJP.

This empirical claim is corroborated by Heiman 1997: “Common reasons given for corporate aversion to [toxic
use reduction] include lack of awareness of engineering alternatives, a myopic focus on very short-term profits, and
an organizational adherence to static ways of doing business (Lewis et al., 1992; Gottlieb et al., 1995). However, we
must also consider corporate aversion to any external interference in the production process itself. While firms can
live with command-and-control rear-end regulation of emissions, allowing a government entity, labour union or
community group to have direct input with decisions over what is produced, and how it is produced, is still viewed
by many as an anathema akin to socialism. Thus, while sustainable industrial output, at least in terms of resource use
and toxic use reduction, is becoming a technical reality, the very structure of the modern corporation, with its
emphasis on a lack of accountability and protection from personal liability, and the requirements of an imperfect
competitive market that does not internalize the negative externalities generated, coupled with feeble attempts by
government to hold corporations accountable for public welfare, have all resulted in a tendency for firms to focus on
short-term profits at the expense of worker, community and environmental health” (pp. 335-336).
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This can have serious consequences. Consider, for example, the US Congress’s passage of
regulations in 1973 requiring a reduction of 80% of standard lead levels in gasoline by 1979. The
rationale for the regulation was that the standard amount of lead in gasoline resulted in airborne
lead levels that were potentially harmful to adults and children in urban areas.53 Importantly,
though, at the time the regulations were imposed there remained scientific uncertainty regarding
whether current levels of airborne lead posed a threat to public health and Congress was
incapable of quantifying the expected benefits of the regulation.54 The regulation was a
precautionary measure; the potential for harm to members of the public was considered
sufficient reason to enact the regulations. Unsurprisingly, the Ethyl Corporation, the preeminent
producer of tetra ethyl lead at the time, rejected Congress’s new regulations and the rationale
used to support it. Ethyl argued in a landmark court case that without conclusive scientific
evidence showing actual harm from leaded gasoline there was insufficient justification for the
costly regulations.55 Fortunately, the court ruled in favor of justifying environmental regulations
on a precautionary basis and the regulations were upheld.56
Considering that the regulations were costly to Ethyl and scientific evidence connecting
leaded gasoline to public health problems was inconclusive, Ethyl’s rationale for rejecting
Congress’s regulations was at least intelligible. The following argument, for instance, appears to
commit no gross errors in reasoning:
“The correct epistemological standard for justifying coercive regulations as costly as those
under consideration is proof that leaded gasoline has actually caused harm to members of the
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public. Without such proof, it is uncertain that the law will bring about benefits that outweigh the
costs. And without a compelling positive cost-benefit analysis, laws and regulations should not
be enacted.”
Assuming Ethyl’s rationale was intelligible, it follows from Vallier’s convergence liberalism
that the regulations were not publicly justified and so should not have been enacted. But of
course, it was later revealed that the law was very important indeed. After the passage of the
regulations on lead levels in gasoline scientific evidence supporting a correlation between lead
levels in gasoline and blood-lead levels in children,57 as well as scientific evidence establishing a
negative correlation between blood-lead levels in children and IQ,58 were able to be generated.
Together these studies effectively establish that leaded gasoline poses a real threat to public
health. Importantly, though, the accumulation of this evidence was possible only because the
regulations imposed by Congress gave researchers a point of reference to compare blood-lead
levels as they correlate to lead levels in gasoline before and after the regulations were enacted. If
the regulations were not enacted because Ethyl had intelligible reason to reject them, the proof
that leaded gasoline does pose a threat to public health may never have become available, or at
least not until harm to the public became empirically detectable by other means.
Congress took a precautionary measure that was grounded in scientific research and good
judgment, motivated by an interest in public health. Especially since public health was on the
line, it can be reasonably expected that such a law would generate widespread support among
members of the public, especially those who have no stake in the profitability of lead-producing
See Environmental Protection Agency, “Great Lakes Binational Toxics Strategy, Draft Report on Alkyl Lead:
Sources Regulations and Options,” available at http://www.epa.gov/grtlakes/bns/lead/steplead.html(last visited Dec.
16, 2004). Reference from Ackerman et al. 2005, p. 167.
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performed worse than children with low lead levels in verbal tests, auditory and speech processing). Reference from
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firms like Ethyl. So, it seems clear that Congress was operating within the bounds of acceptable
use of coercive power. Though Ethyl was coerced into accepting the consequences of the law
against its will, such infringements are justifiable when enacted for the sake of justice, in this
case for the sake of preventing avoidable harm to the public. Since a strict adherence to the
public justification principle threatens to prevent the government from taking such action, that is,
from enacting coercive legislation despite it being intelligibly rejected by one or more members
of the public, the intuition that the law was nonetheless justified suggests that the public
justification principle as expressed by Vallier is misguided because it limits the power of
government to such an extent that it prevents the government from being able to perform its
basic functions. We should thus reject the public justification principle and seek a conception of
the moral limits of state power that better aligns with our considered judgments of the purpose
and function of government.
5

OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES

The worry I have pressed against convergence liberalism is that according to its parameters,
important laws are liable to be defeated. This, I have suggested, risks obstructing the state’s
capacity to address preventable forms of injustice, such as cases where there is good reason to
believe industrial firms infringe on the rights of third parties because of less than fully
responsible industrial practices. This problem results from conceiving the public justification
principle as delineating necessary conditions on the moral permissibility of state coercion.
Evaluative pluralism, together with basic limitations on policy epistemology, make it such that
even truly important laws will be such that they can be intelligibly rejected. In such cases,
convergence liberalism seems to consider it a moral requirement to refrain from imposing laws
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that are widely and justifiably believed to be necessary to effectively protect the rights of
citizens.59
A few possible responses to my argument are worth considering. One may just bite the bullet
and maintain that any law which some member(s) of the public lack sufficient reason to endorse
should not be enacted. Such a position is coherent. As I hope to have shown, though, it is a
position that a great many reasonable persons would have strong reason to reject. If coercive
laws are held to the standard that they must be conclusively justified to all intelligible points of
view, few, if any, significant laws and policies are liable to be publicly justified, which has
extremely bleak prospects for the imposition of significant environmental laws and other laws of
social justice, even when strong evidence that provides a majority of members of the public
conclusive reason to endorse them is at hand. Consider, to return to the example above, a
circumstance in which 80% of members of the public vote in favor of a coercive legal
requirement to gradually reduce lead levels in gasoline by 80% over the course of 5 years. Even
though, in this hypothetical scenario, the scientific evidence is yet inconclusive weather current
lead levels pose a significant threat to public health, those 80% of members of the public believe
it worth the economic costs to err on the side of caution. If the law is defeated because the
producers of tetra ethyl lead, who stand to bear the brunt of the economic costs of the legislation,
do not have sufficient reason to endorse it from their point of view, those members of the public
who endorse the law may have reason to suspect whether the principle of legitimacy at play in
determining political outcomes affords due respect to their political voice and their right to
political participation. Despite this, one may maintain that convergence liberalism, at least as
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Gaus and Vallier develop it, represents the right view of political legitimacy. The argument
presented here does not show that convergence liberalism is internally inconsistent.60 At the very
least, though, it provides strong reason to suspect that the view as it is developed by Gaus and
Vallier has highly questionable practical implications that many are liable to find unacceptable.
Some proponents of convergence liberalism may doubt whether the public justification
principle really does threaten to obstruct the state’s capacity to impose laws that are truly
important. One may argue that every moderately idealized citizen, qua idealized, would have
sufficient reason to endorse laws that are in fact truly essential, or are in fact requirements of
justice.61After all, the justificatory public is idealized specifically in order for PJP to be a
plausible regulative principle on the coercive power of the state, i.e., to avoid patently
unreasonable sociopolitical outcomes.
This line of argument fails, however. Though appealing to moderate idealization may serve
to make the convergence liberal conception of PJP more plausible, moderate idealization cannot
by itself be used to determine whether laws are publicly justified.62 Moderate idealization, as
Vallier and Gaus conceive it, is designed to preserve citizens’ belief-value sets and the
idiosyncrasies of their evaluative standards, doing away only with the reasons that such citizens
may have that are the result of a lack of accessible information or gross errors in reasoning, and
implanting a thin conception of reasonableness.63 Gaus couches the justificatory reasons of
moderately idealized citizens in terms of the reasons that a person would recognize after a
“respectable amount” of reasoning. This reasoning is supposed to be a function of an agent’s
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own evaluative standards, and so the reasons an agent can be expected to have “must be
accessible” to the agent given their evaluative standards and the costs of cognitive activity.64 In
short, the conceptions of moderate idealization Gaus and Vallier adopt seek to provide a
procedural account of the reasons citizens have, meaning that the reasons citizens are identified
to have after idealization is not determined by what reasons there are, external to the beliefs and
evaluative standards of an agent, but is rather determined by the agent’s own reasoning process.65
Accordingly, moderate idealization cannot be used to (reliably) determine specific reasons MOPs
would or should have to endorse policy proposals, especially when such policies can be
intelligibly rejected.66 Thus, even after moderate idealization it remains the case that so long as a
coercive law is intelligibly rejectable, it will be liable to be defeated under convergence
liberalism.
It may be suggested that this worry can be assuaged by idealizing the justificatory public
further, or in a different way. For example, in light of the challenge of publicly justifying
coercive laws for which there is compelling, but inconclusive, scientific evidence to suggest the
law is necessary to effectively protect the (publicly justified) rights of citizens, one may opt to
build more into the model of idealization to get the desired result. For example, one might
stipulate MOPs to have sufficient reason to endorse “policy experiments,” i.e., policies
temporarily enacted to test the efficacy of policy proposals, or to otherwise gather necessary
information to determine whether laws are in fact publicly justified.67 However, while increasing
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idealization of MOPs may improve the chances that important environmental laws and other
laws of social justice will be publicly justified, doing so risks the kind of moral authoritarianism
convergence liberalism is designed specifically to avoid.68
Allow me to explain. The public justification principle is understood to be a criterion by
which the legitimacy of coercive laws is determined. As such, the conditions for legitimacy
delineated by the public justification principle can be helpfully understood as a “test of public
justification”69: so long as the conditions stipulated by PJP are met, the law in question is
legitimate. As Vallier understands it, PJP stipulates that “A coercive law L is justified only if
each member I of the public P has some sufficient reason(s) Ri to endorse L.”70 If PJP is to serve
as a test for public justification, the values of L, I, P and Ri must be specified. These values can
be specified in different ways. As I have argued, the way in which Vallier specifies these values
in Liberal Politics and Public Faith threatens to obstruct the state’s capacity to enact important
laws of social justice. The present suggestion is to attempt to address this worry by increasing the
idealization of the public P to make publicly justifying coercive laws and regulations more
plausible to better enable the state to perform its essential functions. If this is done for the
purpose of publicly justifying a coercive law L that is intelligibly rejectable, however, then some
members of the public (or their moderately idealized counterparts) may have sufficient reason to
reject the conception of PJP according to which L is deemed legitimate. This becomes
problematic if those MOPs do not have sufficient reason of their own to endorse the law in
question. If the law is imposed because it is deemed publicly justified according to a
controversial test of public justification (in this case, a controversial conception of how MOPs
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are to be idealized), imposing that law despite it being intelligibly rejected by some members of
the public arguably fails to respect those MOPs as equally authoritative interpreters of morality’s
demands. Such an outcome, however, is exactly the kind of authoritarianism convergence
liberalism seeks to avoid. Thus, bolstering the idealization of MOPs to generate public
justification on laws that are otherwise intelligibly rejectable is a move unavailable to the
convergence liberal on pain of inconsistency.71
These reflections reveal a dilemma confronting convergence liberalism. If, on the one hand,
the convergence liberal is to stay true to his theoretical aim of avoiding moral authoritarianism
by restricting the set of socially eligible laws to those for whom all moderately idealized
members of the public have sufficient intelligible reason to endorse, the result is that any
coercive law that is intelligibly rejectable is liable to be defeated. But since many important laws
of social justice are liable to be intelligibly rejectable, convergence liberalism threatens to
obstruct the state’s capacity to enact important laws. On the other hand, if the justificatory public
is further idealized to generate public justification for vitally important laws of social justice,
convergence liberalism threatens moral authoritarianism and internal inconsistency. The result is
that convergence liberalism, at least as it is developed by Kevin Vallier in Liberal Politics and
Public Faith, either imposes excessively stringent restrictions on the use of coercion or is
internally inconsistent. Unless one is willing to accept a state with few coercive laws of social
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subject to the reflexivity requirement (RR), i.e., the requirement that the public justification principle itself must be
publicly justified to be a legitimate criterion of political legitimacy. Since PJP is liable to fail RR, in Wall’s view,
convergence liberalism is at odds with its own rationale, i.e., the avoidance of authoritarianism. Here, I agree largely
with Wall, though it seems to me that failing the reflexivity requirement is only problematic when the test of public
justification in question is both intelligibly rejectable and necessary for the public justification of essential laws, as
Vallier 2016 argues. Such is the case, I argue, if the test of public justification is conceived in such a way so as to
render intelligibly rejectable laws publicly justified and legitimate, and so this theoretical move is unavailable to the
convergence liberal on pain of inconsistency. See Billingham (2017) for corroboration and further discussion.
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justice, and bleak prospects for enacting such laws even given compelling evidence indicating
their importance, convergence liberalism ought to be rejected.
6

CONCLUSION

One of the central theoretical goals at the heart of convergence liberalism is the avoidance of
moral authoritarianism in politics.72 Achieving this goal is understood to be necessary for
appropriately respecting the natural freedom and equality of persons. In order to reconcile the
use of coercion to restrict the actions of persons with their status as naturally free and equal
persons, Vallier considers the use of coercion by the state to be legitimate if and only if all
members of the public subject to the coercion have sufficient reason of their own to endorse it.
This moral requirement obtains, in his view, even given the fact of evaluative pluralism, i.e., the
fact that persons have diverse conceptions of the good and standards of evaluation which lead to
deep disagreement. In this essay, I have drawn out some of the practical implications of
conceiving the ideal of public justification as delineating necessary conditions on the use of
coercion by the state. If a coercive law is legitimate only if every member of the public has
sufficient reason to endorse it, it follows that those members of the public that are most inclined
to weigh the costs of coercion very highly and be skeptical of the benefits of coercion must be
able to determine on the basis of their own reasoning that the coercion is warranted. This brings
out the fact that convergence liberalism systematically “tilts” towards less, rather than more
coercion. Given the presence of classical liberals, and the fact that coercive restrictions on
behavior are liable to set back the interests of some MOPs, the requirement that coercion be
endorsed by all turns out to be a very stringent one indeed. As I’ve argued, this requirement is so
stringent that it may threaten to impede the state’s capacity to enact laws and regulations that are
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Vallier 2014, pp. 31 – 33.
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important for realizing the demands of justice. This worry is brought out by the fact that there are
significant epistemic hurdles in generating a positive cost-benefit analysis for any significant
policy proposal that is sufficiently compelling to convince those most skeptical or resistant to
coercion as the case may be. The public justification requirement is a condition that is unlikely to
be met by laws of social justice of any kind, even those for whom compelling, if inconclusive,
evidence suggests the law is necessary to prevent members of the public from infringing on one
another’s basic rights. In such extreme cases, some members of the public, perhaps even a
majority, may have sufficient reason to reject the public justification principle as a criterion for
the legitimacy of coercive laws.
Again, this outcome does not necessarily entail that convergence liberalism is internally
inconsistent or self-defeating. Proponents of the view may argue that even if many members of
the public have sufficient reason to reject PJP as a test of political legitimacy, continuing to use
PJP as a test for the permissibility of laws is not thereby authoritarian because only positive
instances of coercion require public justification; restrictions on its use such as PJP need not
themselves be universally endorsed to be legitimate since they are not (positively) coercive.73 I
do not intend to take a stand on whether this line of argument is successful. I admit that the
argument advanced in this essay does not reveal convergence liberalism as self-defeating. What I
do hope to have shown, though, is that the public justification principle imposes such stringent
restrictions on the use of state coercion that it is liable to engender sociopolitical outcomes that
many reasonable persons will find unacceptable. Convergence liberalism makes it exceptionally
difficult to publicly justify laws of social justice, including environmental laws and regulations
designed to ameliorate the negative impacts of unregulated industrial practices on the
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For an argument along these lines, see Gaus 2011, p. 228.
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environment and public health. Other laws of social justice, such as schemes of redistribution or
prohibitions on group–based discrimination are liable to be similarly defeated. And while this
may be a welcome result for classical liberals and other persons who are especially hostile to
coercion and authoritarianism, many others will reasonably view convergence liberalism as
effectively obstructing collective efforts to realize what justice requires.
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